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Enabling effective electrification of the chemical industry via coordinated demand response

Qi Zhang


Department of Chemical Engineering & Materials Science

University of Minnesota, Twin Cities

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CAPD Energy Systems Initiative (ESI) Seminar


The chemical industry is a major emitter of CO₂



Electrification and CCUS are key emission reduction strategies




CO₂ emissions reductions in the industrial sector in the Sustainable Development Scenario relative to the Stated Policies Scenario



Source: IEA, Energy Technology Perspectives 2020

Electrification of the chemical industry





- **Challenge #1:** increasingly time-sensitive availability and pricing of electricity
- **Challenge #2:** significantly greater number of large electricity consumers
- **Challenge #3:** highly interconnected networks consisting of a large variety of processes



Requires operational flexibility,

but also

**increased demand
response (DR) potential**




May restrict operational flexibility,

but also


**opportunity for non-power-consuming
processes to benefit from DR**

Need **coordinated DR** for maximum operational flexibility and performance

- **Challenge #4:** processes may be owned and operated by different companies/stakeholders




Coordination between one power-intensive process and its downstream customers



Fairness-guided coordinated DR within a general multi-stakeholder process network


Single power-intensive process (industrial load) and its customers



Industrial load is subject to time-varying electricity prices

Downstream customers may not be large electricity consumers

Traditional approach without coordination/cooperation




The industrial load solves:

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{f} &= \min_x f(x) \\ \text{s.t. } &x \in \mathcal{X}(\hat{d}) \end{aligned}$$

Each customer i solves scheduling problem:

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{c}_i &= \min_{y_i, d_i} c_i(y_i, d_i) \\ \text{s.t. } &y_i \in \mathcal{Y}_i(d_i) \\ &d_{ijt}^{\min} \leq d_{ijt} \leq d_{ijt}^{\max} \quad \forall j \in \mathcal{J}, t \in \mathcal{T} \end{aligned}$$

Cooperative DR relies on incentives for changing demand profiles



- Solving a **cooperative DR problem**, the industrial load determines new schedules and proposes payments to the customers
- **Implements a solution that benefits both the industrial load and its customers**
- Solving the same scheduling problem, each customer i determines a reference schedule including \hat{d}_i
- It also submits a cost threshold $\beta_i \hat{c}_i$, indicating when it would agree to deviations in \hat{d}_i

Mathematical formulation of the cooperative DR problem



weighted overall cost function

$$\underset{d,x,y,z,\gamma}{\text{minimize}} \quad \alpha \left(f(x) + \sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}} \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} \sum_{t \in \mathcal{T}} \gamma_j |d_{ijt} - \hat{d}_{ijt}| \right) + (1 - \alpha) \sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}} \left(c_i(y_i, d_i) - \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} \sum_{t \in \mathcal{T}} \gamma_j |d_{ijt} - \hat{d}_{ijt}| \right)$$

$$\text{subject to} \quad x \in \mathcal{X}(d) \quad \text{feasibility for industrial load}$$

$$y_i \in \mathcal{Y}_i(d_i) \quad \forall i \in \mathcal{I} \quad \text{feasibility for customers}$$

$$d_{ijt}^{\min} \leq d_{ijt} \leq d_{ijt}^{\max} \quad \forall i \in \mathcal{I}, j \in \mathcal{J}, t \in \mathcal{T}$$

$$f(x) + \sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}} \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} \sum_{t \in \mathcal{T}} \gamma_j |d_{ijt} - \hat{d}_{ijt}| \leq \hat{f} \quad \text{industrial load's cost must not exceed the reference}$$

$$c_i(y_i, d_i) - \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} \sum_{t \in \mathcal{T}} \gamma_j |d_{ijt} - \hat{d}_{ijt}| \leq \beta_i \hat{c}_i + (1 - \beta_i) \hat{c}_i (1 - z_i) \quad \forall i \in \mathcal{I} \quad \text{customer } i \text{ only agrees to deviate if its cost gets below } \beta_i \hat{c}_i$$

$$|d_{ijt} - \hat{d}_{ijt}| \leq M_i z_i \quad \forall i \in \mathcal{I}, j \in \mathcal{J}, t \in \mathcal{T} \quad \text{can deviate from the reference only if } z_i = 1$$

$$z_i \in \{0, 1\} \quad \forall i \in \mathcal{I}$$

$$\gamma_j \geq 0 \quad \forall j \in \mathcal{J} \quad \text{new variables}$$

Can be interpreted as a (uniform-price) market for *product* DR

Need to solve cooperative DR problem in a distributed manner



Reformulation:

$$\underset{d, [d], x, y, z, \gamma, [\gamma]}{\text{minimize}} \quad \alpha \left(f(x) + \sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}} \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} \sum_{t \in \mathcal{T}} \gamma_j |d_{ijt} - \hat{d}_{ijt}| \right) + (1 - \alpha) \sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}} \left(c_i(y_i, [d]_i) - \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} \sum_{t \in \mathcal{T}} [\gamma]_{ij} |[d]_{ijt} - \hat{d}_{ijt}| \right)$$

subject to

$$x \in \mathcal{X}(d)$$

$$f(x) + \sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}} \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} \sum_{t \in \mathcal{T}} \gamma_j |d_{ijt} - \hat{d}_{ijt}| \leq \hat{f}$$

industrial load's subproblem

$$d_{ijt}^{\min} \leq d_{ijt} \leq d_{ijt}^{\max} \quad \forall i \in \mathcal{I}, j \in \mathcal{J}, t \in \mathcal{T}$$

$$\gamma_j \geq 0 \quad \forall j \in \mathcal{J}$$

$$y_i \in \mathcal{Y}_i([d]_i) \quad \forall i \in \mathcal{I}$$

$$c_i(y_i, [d]_i) - \sum_{j \in \mathcal{J}} \sum_{t \in \mathcal{T}} [\gamma]_{ij} |[d]_{ijt} - \hat{d}_{ijt}| \leq \beta_i \hat{c}_i + (1 - \beta_i) \hat{c}_i (1 - z_i) \quad \forall i \in \mathcal{I}$$

$$|[d]_{ijt} - \hat{d}_{ijt}| \leq M_i z_i \quad \forall i \in \mathcal{I}, j \in \mathcal{J}, t \in \mathcal{T}$$

each customer's subproblem

$$d_{ijt}^{\min} \leq [d]_{ijt} \leq d_{ijt}^{\max} \quad \forall i \in \mathcal{I}, j \in \mathcal{J}, t \in \mathcal{T}$$

$$z_i \in \{0, 1\} \quad \forall i \in \mathcal{I}$$

$$[\gamma]_{ij} \geq 0 \quad \forall i \in \mathcal{I}, j \in \mathcal{J}$$


$$d_{ijt} = [d]_{ijt} \quad \forall i \in \mathcal{I}, j \in \mathcal{J}, t \in \mathcal{T}$$

$$\gamma_j = [\gamma]_{ij} \quad \forall i \in \mathcal{I}, j \in \mathcal{J}$$


introduce copy variables \rightarrow linking constraints

Dualize linking constraints and solve using the alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM)¹


Illustration of ADMM algorithm






Final iteration:



Green ammonia case study



Cooperative DR achieves cost savings for both load and customer





	Load	Customer
Ref.	\$286	\$42
Cent.	\$276 (4.4% savings)	\$41 (2% savings)
Dist.	\$280 (3.2% savings)	\$41 (2% savings)

Sensitivity analysis: effect of dynamic flexibility




- Ammonia reactor's dynamics is characterized by the maximum ramp rate and the minimum constant time





Coordination between one power-intensive process and its downstream customers




Fairness-guided coordinated DR within a general multi-stakeholder process network


Need different coordination approach for general process networks



- Previous method does not directly extend to more complex networks
- **Main question:** How to distribute jointly generated benefits? → **fair allocation**



Envisioned coordinated DR framework





For each process i , we have:

$$s_{ijt} = s_{ij,t-1} + q_{ijt} - \sum_{i' \in \bar{\mathcal{I}}_{ij}} y_{ii'jt} \quad \forall j \in \bar{\mathcal{J}}_i, t \in \mathcal{T}$$

$$s_{ijt} = s_{ij,t-1} - q_{ijt} + \sum_{i' \in \hat{\mathcal{I}}_{ij}} y_{i'ijt} \quad \forall j \in \hat{\mathcal{J}}_i, t \in \mathcal{T}$$

$$y_{ii'jt} \in \mathbb{R}_+ \quad \forall j \in \bar{\mathcal{J}}_i, i' \in \bar{\mathcal{I}}_{ij}, t \in \mathcal{T}$$

material balances

$$(q_i, s_i, r_i) \in \mathcal{X}_i$$

general operational constraints

$$u_i(q_i, s_i, r, y) = \sum_{t \in \mathcal{T}} \left(\sum_{j \in \bar{\mathcal{J}}_i} \sum_{i' \in \bar{\mathcal{I}}_{ij}} \alpha_{ii'jt} y_{ii'jt} - \sum_{j \in \hat{\mathcal{J}}_i} \sum_{i' \in \hat{\mathcal{I}}_{ij}} \beta_{i'ijt} y_{i'ijt} \right) - f_i(q_i, s_i) - h_i(r)$$

utility function

$$h_i(r) = \sum_{t \in \mathcal{T}} \frac{r_{it}}{\bar{r}_t} \bar{h}_t(\bar{r}_t) \quad \text{with} \quad \bar{r}_t = \sum_{i' \in \mathcal{I}} r_{i't}$$

disaggregated electricity cost, $\bar{h}_t(\bar{r}_t)$ assumed to be convex



- Total utility maximization (TUM):

$$\begin{aligned} & \underset{q,s,r,y}{\text{maximize}} && \sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}} u_i(q_i, s_i, r, y) \\ & \text{subject to} && (q, s, r, y) \in \mathcal{F} \end{aligned}$$

- Does not respect individual stakeholders' objectives
- May lead to solutions that favor some processes over others

→ **Need a fair allocation scheme that all stakeholders can agree to**

Use Nash bargaining as the fair allocation scheme



- There are several notions of fairness and corresponding fairness metrics¹
- We apply the definition of fairness proposed by Nash², which involves four axioms:
 1. Symmetry
 2. Pareto optimality
 3. Scale invariance
 4. Independence of irrelevant alternatives
- Fair utility allocation (FUA), maximizing the **Nash product**:


$$\begin{array}{ccc} \text{maximize}_{q,s,r,y} \prod_{i \in \mathcal{I}} [u_i(q_i, s_i, r, y) - \tilde{u}_i] & \xrightarrow{\text{Reformulation}} & \text{maximize}_{q,s,r,y} \sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}} \ln (u_i(q_i, s_i, r, y) - \tilde{u}_i) \\ \text{subject to } (q, s, r, y) \in \mathcal{F} & & \text{subject to } (q, s, r, y) \in \mathcal{F} \end{array}$$

Status-quo solution
("disagreement point")

1. Sampat & Zavala (2019). *Optimization & Engineering*, 20, 1249-1272.

2. Nash (1950). *Econometrica*, 155-162.

Geometrical interpretation of TUM and FUA



Increase overall and individual utilities through revenue sharing




- Some processes may only be able to increase their utilities if additional revenues are made
- Fair allocation with revenue sharing (FRS):

$$\begin{aligned} & \underset{q, s, r, y, z}{\text{maximize}} && \sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}} \ln(u_i(q_i, s_i, r, y) - z_i - \tilde{u}_i) \\ & \text{subject to} && (q, s, r, y) \in \mathcal{F} \\ & && \sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}} z_i = 0, \end{aligned}$$









|
Money
exchanged

- Useful property:** FRS can be solved exactly in two steps
 - Solve TUM
 - Obtain shared revenues by solving a set of linear equations











TUM, FUA, and FRS can all be solved in a distributed manner using ADMM



Configuration	Nash product			Total savings (\$)	
	TUM	FUA	FRS	TUM/FRS	FUA
	7.044	7.062	7.547	4,481	4,403
	7.235	7.304	7.983	9,230	8,608
	6.673 (1)	6.944	8.157	12,903	9,804
	6.658	6.997	7.784	9,948	8,609
	7.085	7.388	8.34	25,006	17,400
	5.980	6.278	7.097	10,878	9,106
	6.186 (3)	6.553	8.023	18,290	11,671
	5.891 (2)	7.187	8.569	33,844	21,786

Comparison of distributed solution methods (for FRS)




Configuration	Direct			2-phase		
	Quality	Time (s)	Iterations	Quality	Time (s)	Iterations
	100	373	1,289	100	73	540
	100	370	982	100	103	633
	99.9	386	993	100	94	693
	100	654	1,206	100	182	773
	100	535	1,047	100	153	828
	99.9	1,381	1,510	100	201	878
	99.5	750	1,208	100	207	800
	99.4	845	1,028	100	157	798


Chlorine network case study



- Chlorine network is responsible for the production of various important chemicals
- Power-intensive chlor-alkali process at its center (accounts for 2% of U.S. electricity use)
- Involved processes exhibit different characteristics in terms of demands and dynamic flexibility¹
- Case study with 11 processes



Revenue sharing increases overall cost savings by 54%




TUM: loss for one process

FUA: \$1,329 cost savings, 94% of which attributed to the chlor-alkali process

FRS: \$2,048 cost savings, evenly divided between the processes/stakeholders

Overall energy consumption profiles





- Coordinated DR can **increase operational flexibility** in process networks, which translates into significant cost savings under time-sensitive electricity pricing
- **Coordinated DR requires:**
 - a mechanism that provides **appropriate incentives** for cooperation
 - a framework that allows **distributed decision making** with minimum information sharing
- **Not perfect:** the FRS solution evenly distributes the surpluses without accounting for the effort made by each process → introducing weights may help



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