

Global Supply Chains Coordination with Optimal Integration of Third Parties

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Enterprise-Wide optimization (EWO) Tele-Seminar


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Global multi-enterprise supply chains



—> Resources flows
— Ownership

- - -> Cash flows
- - -< Information flows

State-of-the-Art

Coordination


Non-cooperative approaches

Cooperative approaches

Stackelberg

Non-symmetrical

- **Bi-level optimization**
 - Yue and You, *Computational Economics and Finance*, 71, 347-361
 - Garcia-Herrero, Mehta, Grossmann, *CACE*, 37, 202
- **Coordination**
 - Huang, He & Lee, *Trans. in Op. Res.*




Nash Equilibrium game

Non-symmetrical roles: competence

- **Fair allocation of profit**
 - Ortiz-Gutiérrez, Giarola, Shah, Bezzo, 2015, *CACE*, 37, 2255-2260
- **Competition between new and existing SCs**
 - Feyzian-Tary, Razmi & Sangari, 2017, *IJLSM*, 26 (4), 515 - 544.

- **Multi-agent coordination**
 - Brunaldi, *Journal of Management Science*, 4 (3), 256-270
- **Risk-sharing**
 - Inderfurth, *Journal of the Operational Research Society*, 36: 525-
- **Multi-agent coordination**
 - Banasik, Póvoa, Singh, 2015, *Journal of Management Science*, 53(39)
- **Fair profit allocation**
 - Liu and Wang, *In press.*




Problem statement

Current practice disregards:

- Detailed operation
- Echelon characteristics
- Independent objectives
- Simple economic transactions
- Average pricing


➔ Not sufficient to obtain
a **global master plan**



Objective: *To develop a global coordination generic model able to optimize the overall SC planning problem*

Global coordination with third parties

Global coordinated SC of multiple echelons



Methodological framework

Cooperative-based coordination

- Incorporating supportive enterprises as **full SCs**.
- Partitioning the SC into echelons.
- **Coalition** towards the whole objective
- Comparison: **typical approach vs. coordinated.**
- **Tactical** and economic decisions.

Mathematical formulations: a holistic tactical model

$$InD_{r',e',t} \leq \sum_{\substack{r \in R \\ r' \neq r}} fac_{r,r',e} \cdot PRD_{r,e,t} \quad \forall r \in R, e \in E, e' \in E, t \in T$$

Coordination

$$\min TCOST = \sum_{e \in E} COST_e \quad \forall e \in E$$

Objective function

$$COST_e = \sum_{t \in T} CRM_{e,t} + CPR_{e,t} + CST_{e,t} + CTR_{e,t} \quad \forall e \in E$$

Cost

$$CRM_{e,t} = \sum_{r \in R} P_{r,e,t} \cdot Q_{r,e,t} \quad \forall e \in E, t \in T$$

RM cost

$$CPR_{e,t} = \sum_{r \in R} upr_{r,e,t} \cdot PRD_{r,e,t} \quad \forall e \in E, t \in T$$



Production cost

$$CST_{e,t} = \sum_{r \in R} ust_{r,e,t} \cdot ST_{r,e,t} \quad \forall e \in E, t \in T$$

Storage cost

$$CTR_{e,t} = \sum_{r \in R} \sum_{\substack{e' \in E \\ e' \neq e}} dis_{e,e'} \cdot utr_{r,e,e'} \cdot DLV_{r,e,e',t} \quad \forall e \in E, t \in T$$

Distribution cost



Sets:

- Echelons: E (production plant, DC, market,...)
- Resources: R (RM, product, energy, cash,...)

Constraints:

Resources balance, correlations, Capacities, ...)

Global coordination- Results


Case study

Polystyrene production SC

- 3 production sites
- 2 storage centers
- 3 markets
- 4 RM suppliers
- WWTP
- 2 products

Energy generation SC

- 6 energy generation sites
- 3 storage centers
- 4 RMs (biomass and coal)
- 2 fixed clients
- 3 polystyrene markets



Detailed master plan: RM purchase; production; storage; and distribution levels

Global coordination- Results



✓ 2 optimization scenarios

Optimization	Current practice	Coordination
Minimize Cost (polystyrene SC)	✓	-
Minimize Cost (energy generation SC)	✓	-
Minimize entire SC Cost	-	✓

Polystyrene production




❑ Current practice

- Overloading plants
- Biased solutions
- Infeasibility
- Overload energy plants



❑ Coordination

- Reallocation plants
- Reduce energy loads



Global coordination- Results



Energy generation

❑ Current practice

- Expensive choices
- Less flexibility

❑ Coordination


- Flexible energy loading
- Cheaper choices




The coordination leads to flexible and feasible decisions for all actors

Global coordination- Economic analysis


Polystyrene SC cost



Energy SC cost




Total savings 2.5% (434 x 10³ m.u)



Unlike the current approaches, the **coordination** based on **detailed description** of all participants leads to **less total cost** and **less resource consumption** for the same market requirements.

Optimal integration of third parties

Objective: *To develop new joint collaboration tools with different competitive third parties in a coordinated SC environment*



Methodological framework

❑ Global coordination

- **Pricing:** joint collaboration tool.
- **Competition:** external actors.
- **Commercial strategies:** price policy
- **Trade-off:** commercial strategy vs SC operation.

❑ Optimization and simulation

- Pricing **approximation** models.
- **Traditional vs. pricing** models.
- **Tactical** and economic decisions

Mathematical formulations


Modelling basis

Objective function


$$\min \sum_{e \in E} \sum_{t \in T} CRM_{e,t} + CPR_{e,t} + CST_{e,t} + CTR_{e,t}$$

$$CRM_{e,t} = \sum_{\substack{e' \in D \\ e' \neq E}} \sum_{r \in R} P_{r,e',t} Q_{r,e',e,t} \quad \forall e \in E; t \in T$$

Price
Quantity



Price policy: as basic element of commercial strategies



Commercial strategies

Pricing approximation models

i) Average fixed (current practice)

$$P_{r,e',t} = \sum_{r \in R} (P_{r,e',t}^{\max} + P_{r,e',t}^{\min}) / 2 \quad \forall e' \in D; e' \in E; e' \neq E; t \in T$$

ii) Polynomial pricing

$$P_{r,e',t} = \sum_{a=1}^A c_{a,r} \cdot (Q_{r,e',e,t})^{A-a} \quad \forall r \in R; e' \in D, e \in E; e' \neq E; t \in T$$

iii) Piecewise pricing




$$\sum_{n \in N} x_{r,e',t,n} \leq 1 \quad \forall r \in R; e' \in D; e \in E; e' \neq e; t \in T$$

$$x_{r,e',t,n} \cdot Q_{r,e',e,t,n-1}^{\max} \leq Q_{n,r,e',e,t,n} \leq x_{r,e',t,n} \cdot Q_{r,e',e,t,n}^{\max} \\ \forall r \in R; e' \in D; e \in E; n \in N; t \in T$$

$$x_{r,e',t,n} \cdot P_{r,e',t,n}^{\max} \leq P_{n,r,e',t,n} \leq x_{r,e',t,n} \cdot P_{r,e',t,n}^{\max} \\ \forall r \in R; e' \in D; n \in N; t \in T$$


$$Q_{r,e',e,t} = \sum_{n \in N} Q_{n,r,e',e,t,n} \quad \forall r \in R; e' \in D; e \in E; e' \neq e; t \in T$$

$$P_{r,e',t} = \sum_{n \in N} P_{n,r,e',t,n} \quad \forall r \in R; e' \in D; t \in T$$




Optimal integration- Results

Case study: Global coordinated SC



Pricing models







Solution procedure





Results- Tactical decisions

Polystyrene production SC




Results- Pricing models optimization

Polystyrene manufacturing SC




Using **discounting pricing** drives the decision-maker to purchase **higher RM amounts** in order to obtain lower prices. This leads to produce **extra products** to be **stored** for later distribution.



Results- Optimization-based simulation



Economic analysis

- Piecewise → best approximation
→ lowest RM cost
- Average fixed (current practice)
→ Worst approximation
→ highest RM cost



	Model	Single equations	Single variables	Discrete variables	Solver	CPU (sec)	Total Cost (x10 ⁶ m.u)	
							Pricing model	Real policy
Average fixed	LP	2,752	4,991	-	CEPLX	0.05	17.00	16.57
Quartic polynomial	NLP	2,952	5,191	-	CONOPT	0.13	16.26	16.42
Linear polynomial	NLP	2,952	5,191	-	CONOPT	0.11	16.49	16.57
Piecewise	MINLP	3,336	5,495	240	DICOPT	5.80	16.25	16.42

Results: Economic analysis



The traditional **average** approximation is **not recommended**

Conclusions

This work constitutes an **advance in PSE** by proposing **novel flexible decision-support tools** enabling **all possible links** with all possible **participants**

□ Cooperative-base global coordination


- Improvement of the global **performance**.
- **Less consumption** of resources.

□ Pricing as collaborative tool

- 3rd parties control their **financial channels**.
- **Discounting** pricing enhances **competence**.
- **Average** approximation is **not recommended**.

Don't lose sight when optimizing individual objectives

I'm glad that the hole
is not on our side!



Future work

This work opens new opportunities for **future research** in the line of multi enterprise-wide coordination (M-EWC) of **multi-participant** SCs.

- ❖ Decentralized optimization.
- ❖ Competence between main actors.
- ❖ Quality of the data.
- ❖ Environmental and social issues.
- ❖ Complex multi-objective models
- ❖ New sources of uncertainty
- ❖ Risk-sharing.
- ❖ New algorithms to solve complex models



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Proactive Management of Uncertainty in Process and Supply Chain Planning

Extending the management horizons in front of the integration paradox

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<http://cepima.upc.edu>



Prof. L. Puigjaner, Dr. M. Graells, Dr. M. Pérez-Moya, Dr. F.J. Roca, Dr. E. Gallego, Dr. E. Velo, Dr. F. Perales

Dr. E. Yamal, Dr. K. Hjaila, Dr. M. Zamarripa, Dr. M. Moreno, Dr. J. Silvente

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J.M. Nougés, A. Shokry, C. Dombayci, F. Audino, S. Morakabatchian, H. Ardakani, G. Lupera, S. Medina, A. Somoza

- General Keyword: Process Systems Engineering (PSE)
- Key words: Optimization, Uncertainty, Robustness, Supply Chain (design, management), Reactive and Proactive Scheduling, Distribution Networks,




Classical approach: **hierarchical - sequential - pyramidal**

- Each decision level imposes decisions / constraints to lower levels
- Each decision level maintain its own objectives and manages its own control variables
- Current standards: same approach
 - Purdue Model → ISA 95 (ISO 62264) + ISA 88 (ISO 61512)

BUT

- The optimal solutions of the individual levels, are the same as the optimal solution of the individual problems?

→ Alternative: Integration into a **Monolithic structure**



Integration benefits: Motivating example

(Laínez *et al.*, C&CE, 2009)

Sequential approach

Marketing

S

SC Design-planning

S

Finances


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Integrated approach

Marketing

SC Design-planning



Finances



Approach	Revenues	Advertising expenditures	Net revenues	Corporate value	Investment in capacity
Sequential	522.32x10 ⁶	86.11x10 ⁶	436.21 x10 ⁶	84.35x10 ⁶	79.77 x10 ⁶
Integrated	512.94x10 ⁶	85.15x10 ⁶	427.79 x10 ⁶	123.93x10 ⁶	43.42 x10 ⁶

-2%

+47%



Classical approach: **hierarchical - sequential - pyramidal**

- Each decision level imposes decisions / constraints to lower levels
- Each decision level maintain its own objectives and manages its own control variables
- Current standards: same approach
 - Purdue Model → ISA 88 (ISO 15849) + ISA 95 (ISO 15926) + ISA 88 (ISO 61512)

BUT


- The optimal solution for the individual levels, are the same as the optimal solution for the individual problems?

→ Alternative: Integration into a **Monolithic structure**

BUT Complex resulting mathematical problem (large and complex)

THEN: Which is the added value? (vs. simplifying assumptions and uncertainty)



The integration paradox



Issues to solve the integration paradox

(Zondervan and de Haan, 23rd ECMS, 2009)


- Structural differences in the models currently used at each hierarchical levels (V
- Lack of a proper Info **Open Issues** between levels
- Lack of a reliable way to incorporate new information (Stobrys & White, 2002?)




- Is there a common management approach?
 - Abstract objective: to maximize the current flexibility
 - Common metrics (what is best?)
- Which elements are under manager (DOFs) ? In which range?
 - Abstract continuous variables (process management, production management)
 - Integer variables (sequences, logic decisions, ...)
- Which is the working scenario?
 - Dynamic situation → Unexpected events/incidences at all decision making levels
 - Competition

Equivalent approach
Equivalent formulation


Process Engineering





Open issues

- Enhance the process operation and flexibility by including the operational knowledge at the design DM problem.
- Integration of planning, scheduling and control at the plant level.
- Ensure consistency, feasibility and optimality across models that are applied over large changes in time scales (years, months, down to days and seconds).




Tactical DM under uncertainty:

- Availability of production resources
- Raw materials supply
- Operating parameters (lead times, transport times, etc.)
- Market scenario (**demand**, prices, delivery requirements, etc.)


Tools:

- **Model Predictive Control** (Bose and Penky, 2000),
- **Multi-Parametric Programming** (Wellons and Reklaitis, 1989; Dua *et al.*, 2009)
- **Fuzzy Linear Programming** (Peidro *et al.*, 2010)
- **Stochastic Programming** (Gupta and Maranas, 2003; You and Grossmann, 2010; Amaro and Barbosa-Póvoa, 2009; Baghalian, 2013; Klibi and Martel, 2012).




Proposed approach

- To extend the scope of the SCM approaches under uncertainty by considering new sources of uncertainty
 - Competitors behavior (Exogenous source of the demand uncertainty), interaction with other SCs, etc.
- To develop Reactive and Proactive approaches to manage this new uncertainty source



- It is necessary to interact with the competitors
 - (cooperative and competitive scenarios)
- Cooperative
 - Vertical integration or coordinated models include cooperation among SC entities.
 - Buyer and seller negotiation lead to changes in the contracts.
- Competitive
 - Nash and Stackelberg Equilibriums to fix the price between seller and buyer.




Change the Multi-Objective Optimization paradigm:

- Move from the typical MOO approach that looks for several objectives (contradictory) →
- Take into account Objectives from different entities
 - **SC producers (economic)**
 - **Customers (Delivery time, quality, etc.)**

Present and prospective analysis

- General models and solution methodology for decision-making under uncertainty. Extended scope (multilevel).
- Computational requirements to solve practical problems.
- Formalism(s) for robustness and flexibility; reactive view of operational uncertainties.
- Integrated production and transport scheduling.
- To integrate third parties / new objectives.



Critical points

- Computational requirements
- Multiple sources of uncertainty
- Multiple and conflicting objectives



Present and prospective analysis:


How decision making robustness can be improved? Which are the benefits?

Development of a general decision-support framework for operational analysis of process systems under uncertainty, to further exploit their flexibility, taking advantage of the uncertainty characterization for efficient and robust predictive (proactive) decision-making.

- Study of different sources of uncertainty and their effects at tactical / operational levels.
- Evaluation of robustness measures.
 - ✓ Formalism(s) for production to distribution robustness.
- Equation-based and procedure-oriented approaches.
- Sampling techniques.
- Extensions to the integrated / multilevel view

Previous step: Information Integration/conceptualization

Muñoz, E.; Capón-García, E.; Espuña, A.; Puigjaner, L.: Ontological Framework for Enterprise-wide Integrated Decision-making at operational level, Computers and Chemical Engineering, 2012 (<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.compchemeng.2012.02.001>)





Proactive Management of Uncertainty in Process and Supply Chain Planning

Extending the management horizons in front of the integration paradox

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